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Introduction
Localism is on the rise in Hong Kong, as attested by the proliferation ofself-proclaimed localist political parties and their rising electoral sup-port in recent elections. What has caused the rise of localism? Extant
studies focus predominantly on cultural explanations, such as generational
politics (Wong, Zheng, and Wan 2017), Hong Kong identity and anti-China
sentiment (Ma 2011, 2017; Veg 2017; Kaeding 2017), or societal approaches
(So 2017). 
In this article, we argue that in addition to cultural and social factors, there
is an economic origin that contributes to the political ascendancy of the
localist parties: homeownership. The inexorable rise of asset prices in Hong
Kong, due to both regional and global factors, is associated with impactful
redistributive consequences; asset-holders continue to benefit, while those
without any assets are lagging farther and farther behind with respect to
wealth distribution. This wealth inequality further translates into divergent
preferences over the socio-economic status quo: asset-holders are anxious
to preserve it, whereas non-asset holders are willing to challenge it. Our ar-
gument yields distinct, testable hypotheses for voting behaviour. Using
newly available election study data, we find strong support for our argu-
ment. In particular, we find that homeownership is a significant predictor
of political identification and vote choice in the 2016 Legislative Council
election. In particular, homeowners are less likely to identify with localists
and more likely to vote for pro-establishment parties.
The rest of the article is divided into the following sections. In the first
part, we discuss the rise of localism in Hong Kong in recent years and some
dominant explanations for this phenomenon. We then present our argu-
ment. In the next section, we present the hypotheses, followed by a discus-
sion of the data and operationalisation in the fourth section. Finally, we
present the results of the empirical analysis. We then make concluding re-
marks.
The rise of localism in Hong Kong
The meanings of localism or the localist camp have changed over time
since Hong Kong’s sovereignty transfer in 1997. We can broadly divide the
term localism into two sub-categories, namely left-wing localism and right-
wing localism. 
The changing face of localism in Hong Kong
In the first decade after the sovereignty transfer, the term localism was
often associated with the construction of a local cultural identity. Hong
Kong witnessed several large-scale social movements of heritage conser-
vation such as the Preserving Lee Tung Street Movement in 2004 and the
Star Ferry and Queen’s Pier Movement in 2006. The activists involved in
these movements were usually identified as “left-wing localists” (Veg 2017;
Kaeding 2017), because unlike social activists of the previous generations,
who had a keen interest in the social and political development of main-
land China, these activists focused almost exclusively on local economic
problems, including income inequality and “real-estate hegemony” (Wong
2015a). (1) Ku (2012) points out that local activists were shifting their ac-
tion framework from global interests to everyday life, rethinking how to
balance life space and developmentalism. These movements have arguably
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The data used in this article come from the Hong Kong Election Study (HKES), a research project
generously funded by the Research Grants Council of Hong Kong (GRF Ref. No.: 14615915).
1. The term “real estate hegemony” emerged circa 2010. It reflects a widely held belief that the gov-
ernment is controlled by business interests, especially the interest of the real estate sector. 
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inspired a new wave of social activism in Hong Kong’s young generations
(Ku 2012). 
Left-wing localism was gradually eclipsed by right-wing localism in the sec-
ond decade after the sovereignty transfer. Many advocacy groups can be sub-
sumed under the umbrella term right-wing localism; even though their core
ideas are not necessarily compatible or coherent, the overtones of these
groups are distinctly more inward-looking than left-wing localism. At times,
they even appeal to people’s anti-immigrant and anti-mainland sentiments.
In particular, right-wing localists often emphasise that Hong Kong has its own
political system, (2) culture, and institutions that should be kept unmolested
by the negative influences of mainland Chinese. Some groups have openly
advocated an anti-China sentiment (Ma 2015, 2017), self-determination, and
independence (Lee 2017). Right-wing localism coincides with political radi-
calisation, which manifests itself in the emergence of political violence (Yuen
2015; Lee 2017). (3) One illustrative example was the 2016 Mongkok Riot. (4)
Electoral success 
How popular is the localist camp? Elections provide an imperfect, yet use-
ful, indicator of public support for the localist camp. In the 2015 District
Council election, many localist candidates made their electoral debut. Some
succeeded in capturing seats. In the 2016 Legislative Council by-election
for the New Territories East geographical constituency, which was held a
month after the Mongkok Riot, Edward Tin-kei Leung, the former spokesper-
son for a right-wing localist group, Hong Kong Indigenous, gained a sizable
number of votes (15.3% of the total vote), despite the presence of candi-
dates from the two main political camps (namely, the pan-democratic and
pro-establishment camps). 
Localists emerged as a third force to challenge the existing political order
in the 2016 Legislative Council election of the following September. Right-
wing localists such as Wai-ching Yau, Baggio Leung and Chung-tai Cheng
managed to obtain 10.9% of the vote, which entitled them to three seats.
Left-wing localists (also known as progressive localists (Ma 2017)) Eddie
Hoi-dick Chu, Siu-lai Lau, and Nathan Kwun-chung Law were elected, cap-
turing 8% of the total vote. In other words, candidates of the two localist
wings together won 19% of the total vote. The unprecedented electoral
success of the localists was indicative of this camp’s rising public support.
An important question is, “who supports or opposes the localists?” 
Existing explanations of the rise of localism
Extant works that study the rise of localism in Hong Kong revolve around
three dimensions: cultural identity, democratic transition, and mainland in-
tegration. For the cultural identity explanation, studies argue that the rise
of the Hong Kong identity leads to public support for localism (Ip 2015; Veg
2017; Ma 2017; Kaeding 2017; Steinhardt, Li, and Jiang 2017) or at least
provides a basis for a discursive change (Chan 2017). However, cultural iden-
tification as a Hong Konger is not tantamount to support for localism. Cul-
tural identity is also a fluid and contested concept. Some political parties,
including those from the pro-establishment camp, actually compete to de-
fine themselves as the “real locals.” It is also important to note that the rise
of localism is potentially a global phenomenon (Levitsky and Ziblatt 2018). 
The democratic transition thesis focuses on the tortuous and never-ending
political transition that Hong Kong has experienced. Although the democ-
racy movement has lasted for decades, no substantial progress has been
made. Many pro-democracy supporters are suffering from “transition fa-
tigue” (Ma 2011), which in turn translates into growing dissatisfaction with
traditional opposition parties, commonly known as the pan-democrats. (5)
The stalled transition may also undermine the patience of members of the
traditional opposition elite, making them more willing to compromise with
the government on political reforms. In particular, the Democratic Party’s
support for a government-initiated political reform in 2010 was lambasted
by radical political groups, who saw the party’s endorsement as a betrayal
of democracy. This incident has deepened the internal conflict within the
opposition camp. Many supporters of the radical opposition saw pan-
democrats as the vested interest of the status quo, if not a secret collabo-
rator with the government (Wong 2015b). Meanwhile, electoral support for
right-wing localists steadily increased at the expense of the traditional op-
position camp. 
Elite dissension continued to plague the opposition camp in subsequent
years. (6) The radical wing advocated a more militant approach to fighting
for democracy, while belittling the traditional opposition’s stubborn adher-
ence to peaceful, dialogue-seeking tactics, which brought no substantial
progress. During the Umbrella Movement, the authorities’ heavy-handed
approach further divided the opposition. As the movement failed to extract
any concessions from Beijing, many believe that there is no way to achieve
a democratic transition as long as Hong Kong remains part of China. The
idea of separatism and self-determination emerged in society, and gained
traction among right-wing localism supporters. 
Another likely cause for rising anti-mainland sentiment was Hong Kong’s
deep social integration with mainland China since the sovereignty transfer,
especially after 2003. Mainland Chinese could apply to migrate to Hong
Kong if they manage to obtain a “one-way permit” from mainland author-
ities. The permit has a daily quota of 150. Since 1997, about one million
mainland Chinese have settled in Hong Kong. They account for one-seventh
of the city’s population (Wong, Ma, and Lam 2018). The large influx of these
immigrants has aroused unease or even hostility among Hong Kong locals.
As in other societies, it takes time for these immigrants to assimilate into
the local community. The process may trigger clashes with locals due to
differences in values and norms. For one thing, mainland immigrants in
Hong Kong tend to hold political preferences different from local people;
they are more likely to identify themselves with the pro-establishment
camp (Wong, Ma, and Lam 2016, 2018). 
32 c h i n a  p e r s p e c t i v e s •  N o . 2 0 1 8 / 3
2. Prior to the sovereignty transfer, Beijing promised to govern Hong Kong under the principle of
“one country, two systems,” which allows Hong Kong to keep its own political institutions, market
economy, and civil liberties. 
3. Comparing with radical wing parties and localism advocates, traditional opposition parties such
as the Democratic Party and Civic Party are more in favour of a peaceful and orderly change of
the political system. The pan-democrats’ moderate approach to fighting for democracy is often
portrayed as ineffectual and biased toward the status quo. 
4. Lau Stuart et al., “Mongkok Riot: How Hong Kong’s First Night in the Year of the Monkey De-
scended into Mayhem,” South China Morning Post, 10 February 2016, https://www.scmp.com/
news/hong-kong/article/1911341/mong-kok-riot-how-hong-kongs-first-night-year-monkey-de-
scended-mayhem (accessed on 30 August 2018).
5. Since the sovereignty transfer, the opposition has repeatedly used the cue of democratic transition
to mobilise support in street protests and in the voting booth. As the democratic transition is
nowhere in sight, the cue of democratic transition has lost its appeal to citizens, which may con-
tribute to the emergence of “transition fatigue.” One illustrative example is the July 1 Rally, an
annual anti-government procession. Its turnout declined significantly after the Umbrella Move-
ment. HKUPOP, “七一遊行人數點算計劃” (Qi yi youxing renshu diansuan jihua, July 1 rally
headcounting project), HKU POP SITE, 1 July 2018, https://www.hkupop.hku.hk/english/features/
july1/index.html (accessed on 25 August 2018).
6. For instance, Neo Democrats, a localist political party split from the Democratic Party; Hong Kong
Indigenous and Youngspiration’s protest tactics and political stances are significantly different
from the pan-democrats.
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In addition, Hong Kong has also witnessed a massive influx of mainland
tourists. Thanks to the introduction of the Individual Visit Scheme (IVS) in
2003 and the one-year multiple-entry policy in 2009, the number of in-
bound tourists from mainland China increased from 12 million in 2004 to
45 million (or 77% of all tourists) in 2015. This influx has boosted the local
economy while simultaneously fuelling a variety of social problems, includ-
ing congestion (So 2017), the growth of parallel trade activities, and a short-
age of daily goods and public facilities such as hospital beds and delivery
rooms (Tang and Yuen 2016; Legislative Council 2012). Public resentment
culminated in a series of anti-mainland protests such as “recovering Sheung
Shui and against cross-border traders.” 
The above explanations, while capturing certain aspects of the rise of lo-
calism in Hong Kong, almost entirely ignore the economic factor. This omis-
sion is unwarranted, because the rather small open economy of Hong Kong
during this period has experienced dramatic changes. In what follows, we
will discuss how these changes produce redistributive consequences that
ultimately manifest themselves in politics.
Our argument
Our central argument is that global and regional economic factors have
contributed to the escalation of asset prices in Hong Kong, which in turn
has significantly widened wealth inequality in Hong Kong since the mid-
2000s. The “winners” of such economic development are not necessarily
high-skilled workers, because high-skilled workers without assets are likely
worse off if the return on human capital fails to catch up with the increase
in asset prices. Our argument yields a distinct implication for individual po-
litical attitudes: asset owners are significantly more satisfied with the status
quo than those without assets. Their attitudinal difference will also manifest
itself politically; those without assets are more likely to support political
parties that challenge the status quo, while asset holders are likely support-
ers of parties that defend the existing socio-economic order.
The subprime mortgage crisis that broke out in the United States in the
late 2000s and the ensuing Great Recession that wreaked havoc on the
global economic order have stimulated research on the relationship be-
tween asset ownership and political outcomes. Studies find that assets,
rather than income, are a stronger predictor of one’s political preference
and participation. Persson and Martinsson (2016) argue that assets such
as property ownership must be analysed separately from both social class
and income, for asset ownership has an independent effect on people’s
economic self-interest. Some scholars point out that high-risk assets hold-
ers such as homeowners tend to be politically conservative and oppose re-
source redistribution. On the other hand, numerous studies find that
income has limited influence on political attitudes (Nadeau, Foucault, and
Lewis-Beck 2010, 2011; Lewis-Beck, Nadeau, and Foucault 2013). Stubager,
Lewis-Beck, and Nadeau (2013) argue that asset holders tend to support
the government and politicians who can protect and increase their asset
values. Page, Bartels, and Seawright (2013) contend that wealthy citizens
are concerned more about tax rates and unemployment rates than about
(traditional, democratic, and progressive) values. In addition, studies show
that homeowners participate in politics and elections actively to maintain
public policies beneficial to the housing market (Holian 2011; Zavisca and
Gerber 2016). Ansell (2014) and Persson and Martinsson (2016) further
suggest that higher asset or housing values cause stronger conservative
effects. 
The key insight of these studies is that homeowners want to maintain
a stable political environment because they are the vested interests of
the status quo (Verberg 2000; Conley and Gifford 2006; Doling and
Ronald 2010). Lee and Yu (2012) argue that the homeowner effect is
strong in authoritarian or hybrid regimes such as Singapore and Hong
Kong. Their observation is consistent with recent democratisation theo-
ries that link democratic transition to capital mobility (Acemoglu and
Robinson 2005; Boix 2003); people who hold immobile assets are more
likely to support the authoritarian incumbent because they have diffi-
culty transferring their assets abroad in anticipation of likely tax increases
after democratisation. 
The inexorable rise of asset prices in Hong Kong
In the post-war period, Hong Kong’s housing market has gone through
several boom and bust cycles. Most notably, in 1997, Hong Kong experi-
enced a dramatic economic recession as a result of the Asian Financial Crisis.
The crisis also punctured the housing bubble developed in the previous
years. In the following years, housing demand continued to contract. 
Figure 1 shows that the housing price index reached a high level of 163.1
in 1997, and the rental price index also peaked at 134.5. Both indices, how-
ever, dropped by half to 61.6 and 73.6 between 1997 and 2003, before re-
turning to their long-run upward trend in the years after. In particular, since
2009, housing prices have recorded the strongest and longest period of
growth. By 2015, the housing price index reached an unprecedentedly high
level at 296.8, twice what it was in 1997. The rental price index also reached
174.7, a 30% increase from 1997. It is also worth noting that the hike is
across-the-board, regardless of the size of the housing units. In fact, since
2009, the price increase of small housing units has often surpassed that of
larger, luxurious types of quarters. This implies that home ownership is in-
creasingly out of the reach of ordinary citizens.
Conversely, the change in real wages was much less dramatic during the
same period. As seen in Figure 1, the real wage index looks almost like a flat
line compared with all other indices related to housing. The discrepancy be-
tween wage increase and the growth of asset prices sets the current housing
boom apart from that observed in mainland China and those previously
seen in Hong Kong. For instance, many housing booms in Hong Kong in the
second half of the last century accompanied remarkable wage growth. Per-
haps this is also why previous booms failed to generate a deep political di-
vide in society.
Decreasing housing affordability has forced many potential home buyers
to stay longer in the rental market, which in turn drives up rental prices.
Many citizens therefore need to adjust their living quality downward in
order to satisfy their housing demands. The housing boom has actually
caused the proliferation of substandard quarters such as “subdivided flats,”
referring to apartments partitioned into two or more cubicles often
equipped with independent toilet and kitchen facilities. Ironically, the oc-
cupants of these substandard flats are not necessarily the most impover-
ished, who may have access to government subsidised housing (i.e. public
rental estate housing). A recent government report shows that subdivided
units are currently housing approximately 5,000 citizens who identify their
occupation as managers, administrators, and professionals (Census and
Statistic Department 2018). The finding of the report suggests that income
is not an accurate measure of wealth. Many in Hong Kong have become
“income rich, asset poor.” 
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Global and regional factors
The inexorable rise of property prices in Hong Kong is due to both global
and regional factors. Asset prices are influenced by monetary policy and
money supply (Eickmeier and Hofmann 2013). The global housing boom
prior to 2008 was mainly caused by deregulation and subprime mortgages,
which ultimately engendered the Great Recession that struck all major
economies. To deal with the economic crisis, the central banks of countries
such as the United States, England, European countries, and Japan resorted
to a controversial monetary policy tool, quantitative easing (QE), to stim-
ulate the market (Coën, Lefebvre, and Simon 2018; Weale and Wieladek
2016; Rahal 2016). Quantitative easing involves a central bank’s purchase
of a massive amount of government bonds and targeted financial assets in
order to increase liquidity and provide stimulus to the economy. The in-
crease in money supply stimulates spending and investment. Much of the
investment capital has been funnelled to global housing and stock markets.
Rahal (2016) shows that residential investment responded strongly to the
new monetary policy. Huston and Spencer (2018) further suggest that the
explosive increase in money supply as a result of quantitative easing has
fuelled asset bubbles. Weale and Wieladek (2016) find that large-scale asset
purchases have sent global asset prices to a risky level. 
The quantitative easing of the United States rapidly fuelled a housing
boom in Hong Kong, in part because Hong Kong’s currency is pegged to the
US dollar. As the US dollar remained weak, assets in this small open econ-
omy looked more attractive to investors compared with assets in other
countries of the region. The timing also coincided with Hong Kong’s relax-
ation of tourism and immigration policies geared toward mainland Chinese,
who began looking for overseas investment opportunities thanks to the ap-
preciation of the Renminbi (RMB). In fact, Hong Kong plays a unique and
crucial role in the internationalisation of the RMB (Leung 2011; Eichengreen,
and Lombardi 2017). In 2004, Hong Kong became the world’s first market
to conduct offshore RMB business, and the RMB cross-border trade settle-
ment within the pilot areas was expanded to 20 provinces in 2010 (Wang
2017). Hong Kong has long been the largest RMB offshore hub over the
world. As Germain and Schwartz (2017) mentioned, fully 80% of the RMB
credit transactions in the world occurred between Chinese and Hong Kong
entities. RMB internationalisation heavily relied on Hong Kong, which im-
plies an enormous capital influx into the city, stimulating, not surprisingly,
its housing market. Both global and regional factors therefore helped create
one of the most lasting housing booms in the city. 
Government responses and their limitations
Cross-border flows and exchange depend on the creation of liquidity that
is the result of a complex set of regulations and institutions. For this reason,
the government has an important role to play. In the case of Hong Kong,
the government since the colonial period has claimed to adhere to the lais-
sez-faire principle, (7) which provides some leeway for the government to
justify its economic inaction (Goodstadt 2005). In addition, the city had
experienced an extended period of recession in the housing market (1997-
2003). For this reason, during the long-running housing boom since the mid-
2000s, the Hong Kong government was reluctant—at least initially—to
contain the hike in housing prices, claiming that it should not interfere in
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7. Some contend that in essence the state consciously engineered a finance-led growth model (Ip
2017) that engendered a land-dependent economy (Wong 2015a).
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Figure 1 – Changes in property prices and real wages in Hong Kong (1981-2017)
the housing market. However, skyrocketing property prices brewed public
discontent. In 2010, the Hong Kong government began to levy duties on
some real estate transactions. Despite these belated measures, housing and
rental prices kept breaking record highs. 
Extant works show that in Hong Kong, housing prices influence people’s
trust of the government and happiness, perhaps for a good reason. The
Hong Kong government since 1997 has been based on the political sup-
port of a narrow coalition of business elites spearheaded by real estate
developers. (8) As Bueno de Mesquita and Smith (2011) point out, regimes
that depend on a small “winning coalition” tend to provide less public
good. In the case of Hong Kong, Ma (2016) finds that members of the
functional constituencies of the Legislative Council, who represent sectoral
interests, lobbied for favourable policies and more state resources. It is
therefore not surprising that many in Hong Kong suspect collusion be-
tween the government and property developers. Similarly, many do not
believe that the government is genuinely interested in containing the hike
in housing prices, because doing so would undermine the vested interests
of the real estate elite. 
The level of distrust in the government varies. Wong, Zheng, and Wan
(2016, 2017) find that higher housing prices (Centa-City Index, CCI) increase
people’s political trust but damage the ratings of the Chief Executive. How-
ever, they suggest that housing prices have heterogeneous effects on indi-
viduals. Using an Age-Period-Cohort model, they find that higher housing
prices damage young people’s (below 25 years old) satisfaction with the
government. Another study shows that economic growth and the rise of
housing prices make people happier, but the effects are significant only
among the middle-aged and the elderly (Chiu and Wong 2017). Castro Cam-
pos et al. (2016) find that only 18% of university students have the confi-
dence and willingness to buy high-quality private housing in the future. The
finding indicates that the hike in asset prices has far exceeded the return
on education or human capital, such that even well-educated young people,
who are likely high-wage earners, feel pessimistic about their financial fu-
ture. Indeed, Wong (2015a) argues that most college graduates are not
wealthy enough to become property owners, while their wage level disqual-
ifies them from public rental housing. They are squeezed between rising
asset prices and decreasing returns on education, rendering them more po-
litically radical. Thus, many protests during this period were framed against
the so-called “real estate hegemony.” 
As discussed, the inexorable rise of asset prices is associated with impact-
ful redistributive consequences; asset-holders continue to benefit, while
those without asset are lagging farther and farther behind with respect to
wealth distribution. 
Hypotheses
We argue that asset ownership is an important factor that shapes one’s
political preferences in Hong Kong. Because homeowners enjoy a value-
adding asset, they would favour political parties that preserve the status
quo, while opposing political forces that challenge it. Localist parties are fa-
mous or infamous for their radical tactics and political ideologies, such as
independence and self-determination, both of which are likely to provoke
a heavy-handed state crackdown, thereby threatening political stability.
These constitute the first hypotheses of this study:
H1. Homeowners are less likely to favour the localist camp than non-home-
owners.
H2. Homeowners are more likely to favour the pro-establishment camp
than non-homeowners.
H3. Homeowners’ probability of voting for the localist camp is significantly
lower than the probability of voting for the pro-establishment camp.
H4. Income is not a significant predictor of political identification.
H5. Income is not a significant predictor of vote choice.
The first two hypotheses are about political identification, while the last
one is concerned with vote choice. These two concepts are not exactly iden-
tical for two reasons. First, political identification measures one’s affinity
for a particular party or political camp. One can favour more than one party,
especially when party identification in places such as Hong Kong is weak.
However, vote choice in many cases involves selecting one out of many
similar options. 
Vote choice is further complicated by the possibility of strategic voting;
one may not necessarily vote for a party that represents one’s “ideal point.”
The issue of strategic voting is salient in Hong Kong because the District
Council elections adopt the electoral formula of single-member districts. Al-
though direct elections to the Legislative Council adopt proportional repre-
sentation (PR), Carey (2017) shows that the particular PR employed in Hong
Kong (namely, PR using the Hare Quota with Largest Remainders formula)
produces a high degree of fragmentation of party lists. Under such circum-
stances, voters have an incentive to vote strategically in order to prevent the
least preferred party or political camp from getting elected. In fact, in the
2016 Legislative Council election, some pro-democracy activists organised
a large-scale vote-coordination campaign known as the “Thunder Go” in
hopes of maximising the performance of the opposition camp as a whole. 
It is important to study vote choice, as the outcome determines the rel-
ative power of political camps. This is not to say, however, that the measure
of political identification is immaterial. It can reflect one’s genuine political
preferences independent of electoral considerations. For instance, a localist
supporter may not vote for the localist camp, simply because its chance of
getting elected is slim. But if more and more citizens subscribe to localism,
this camp may eventually overcome the tipping point that prevents it from
being chosen under strategic voting. For this reason, we separately examine
political identification and vote choice in the following empirical analysis. 
As discussed, global and regional economic factors affect wealth inequality
in Hong Kong through asset prices. The resulting political fault line is be-
tween asset holders versus non-asset holders, rather than between high-
and low-income groups. In fact, it is no longer uncommon to find wage
earners who are “income rich, asset poor.” We therefore predict that income
is not a significant predictor of political identification and vote choice (H4
and H5).
Data and operationalisation
We test our hypotheses using a post-election survey collected immedi-
ately after the 2016 Legislative Council election. The survey, which is part
of a larger election study project known as the Hong Kong Election Study
(HKES), was implemented by YouGov using its online panel. The post-elec-
tion survey re-targeted 4,148 respondents who had completed a pre-elec-
tion survey, and successfully retained 1,776 respondents (42.8%). 
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directors or major shareholders serving in a Beijing-designed co-optation institution, the Election
Committee.
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We focus on the post-election survey because voters may not reveal their
ultimate vote choice in the pre-election survey for at least two reasons.
First, they may strategically manipulate their answers to affect the outcome
of the poll. (9) Second, they may genuinely not know who they will vote for,
because their ultimate decision depends on final poll results. (10)
Our dependent variables of interest are political identification and vote
choice. The former is measured by a survey question: “How much do you
like the following camp: pan-democrat, pro-establishment, and localist.” For
each political camp, respondents need to provide a rating ranging from 1
to 10, with 1 indicating “like the least” and 10 “like a lot.” We construct
three variables to represent these camps’ ratings across respondents:
LikePanDemo, LikeProEst, and LikeLocal.
The survey has a question that asks respondents to report their vote
choice. We classify their answers into the three dominant political camps:
pro-establishment, pan-democrat, and localist. For detailed classification,
see the Appendix. We construct a categorical variable, Vote, to denote a
respondent’s vote choice, where those who voted for the localist camp are
assigned a value of “1,” those who voted for the pan-democrats a value of
“2,” and those who voted for the pro-establishment camp a value of “3.” 
The key independent variable is home ownership, which is constructed
from one survey question: “Do you own, wholly or partially, a property
in Hong Kong?” A dummy variable Homeowner is assigned the value of
“1” if a respondent answers “Yes” and “0” otherwise. Another independent
variable of interest is Income. The survey asks respondents to report their
household income by choosing one of the eight income groups. (11)
To reduce omitted variable bias, we also control for a variety of demo-
graphic variables that are likely correlated with the outcome and/or the
variable of interest. In particular, as mentioned, young people in Hong Kong
are torn between rising asset prices and a decreasing return on education.
Their dissatisfaction with the status quo is likely high, while at the same
time young people are unlikely to own property. Thus, we include a control
variable for young people (Young) in all specifications. (12) Other control
variables include Female, Married, Education, and whether one was born
in Hong Kong (HKborn). Table 1 shows the summary statistics of all the
variables. 
Results
We first examine the effect of home ownership on political identification. In
Table 2, we report the OLS regression results on political identification. (13) The
results are similar. First, consider the localist camp. Homeowners are less likely
to favour the localist camp than those who have no property. (14) By contrast,
homeowners have a stronger affinity for the pro-establishment camp. (15)
What about affinity for the traditional opposition camp (namely, the pan-
democrats)? The results show that homeowners have no obvious preference
for the pan-democrats. (16) Taken together, the findings support Hypotheses
1 and 2, that homeowners are less likely to favour the localist camp and
more likely to favour the pro-establishment camp than non-homeowners.
If homeowners favour the status quo, one may predict that high income
individuals would also have a similar status quo bias. This is not the case,
however. Consistent with Hypothesis 4, income is not a strong predictor of
political identification and has no significant effect on people’s political
preferences. (17) The result is not surprising, considering that many high-in-
come individuals are unable to acquire homes. The salient political fault line
lies in assets rather than income.
Besides, the results in Specifications (3) and (6) show that Young people
favour the localist camp more than other age groups and have a weaker affin-
ity for the pro-establishment camp, which indicates that the localist camp is
a lot more popular among young adults than the pro-establishment camp. (18)
As for the other control variables, we only report those with a statistically
significant coefficient. Married respondents tend to favour the pan-demo-
crat camp less and the pro-establishment camp more. Consistent with the
findings in Wong, Lam, and Ma (2016), respondents born in Hong Kong tend
toward the pan-democratic rather than the pro-establishment camp.
Table 3 displays the multinomial logistic regression results related to the
second dependent variable of interest, vote choice. The results are largely
similar to political identification. (19)
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9. “票站調查憂配票選民答相反意向” (Piaozhan diaocha you peipiao, xuanmin da xiangfan yixiang,
Voters lie about their voting preference during the exit poll as they worried about tactical voting con-
ducted by pro-establishment camp), Ming Pao, 23 November 2015, https://news.mingpao.com/pns/dai-
lynews/web_tc/article/20151123/s00001/1448218650384 (accessed on 27 February 2018).
10. This is also the operation logic of the “Thunder Go” vote coordination campaign, which asked
voters to wait for their final poll result, which was released on election night, before going to the
voting station.
11. The eight groups are (1) HKD9,999 or less; (2) HKD10,000 – 19,999; (3) HKD20,000 – 29,999;
(4) HKD30,000 – 39,999; (5) HKD40,000 – 49,999; (6) HKD50,000 – 59,999; (7) HKD60,000 –
79,999; (8) HKD80,000 or above. 
12. To ensure that the empirical results are robust to the choice of the youth cut-off point, we include
a dummy variable Young25 that is assigned a value of “1” if a respondent is aged 25 or below
and “0” otherwise, and we use an alternative dummy Young30 that is assigned a value of “1” to
respondents aged 30 and “0” otherwise.
13. A dummy variable Young25 is included in Specifications (1) to (3); and a different youth cut-off
point Young30 is used in Specifications (4) to (6).
14. The variable of interest, Homeowner, has a negative sign on LikeLocal, as may be seen in both
Specifications (3) and (6).
15. The coefficient on the variable Homeowner is positive and significant in Specifications (2) and (5).
16. Specifications (1) and (4) show that the variable of interest Homeowner is not significantly cor-
related with the dependent variable LikePanDemo.
17. The coefficient on Income is not statistically different from zero in any of the specifications.
18. The variable Young, whether the cut-off is at 25 or 30 years of age, is positively and significantly
correlated with LikeLocal in Specifications (3) and (6). Young is also negatively and significantly
correlated with LikeProEst.
19. The difference between Specifications (1) and (2) lies in that the first uses 25 years of age as a
cut-off point for the variable Young, while the second uses 30. For both Specifications (1) and
(2), the baseline comparison group is the pro-establishment vote (namely, Vote = 3). The coeffi-
cients on the first column of each specification are the relative log odds of voting localists versus
voting pro-establishment, while those on the second column are the relative log odds of voting
pan-democrat versus voting pro-establishment.
Special feature
Table 1 – Summary statistics
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
LikePanDemo 1,677 5.00 2.40 0 10
LikeProEst 1,689 3.70 2.80 0 10
LikeLocal 1,660 4.54 2.66 0 10
VotePanDemo 1,776 0.25 0.43 0 1
VoteProEst 1,776 0.22 0.41 0 1
VoteLocal 1,776 0.19 0.40 0 1
Homeowner 1,776 0.41 0.49 0 1
Young25 1,776 0.16 0.37 0 1
Young30 1,776 0.31 0.46 0 1
Income 1,776 4.43 1.75 1 8
Female 1,776 0.56 0.50 0 1
Married 1,776 0.46 0.50 0 1
Education 1,776 7.60 2.78 1 11
HKborn 1,776 0.90 0.30 0 1
Notes: For ease of interpretation, we divide the categorical variable Vote into three
dummy variables: VotePanDemo, VoteProEst, and VoteLocal.
Definition of young: Young <= 25 Young <= 30
As expected, the variable of interest, Homeowner, has a negative sign on
the first column in Specifications (1) and (2), indicating that the probability
of homeowners voting for the localist camp is significantly lower than the
probability of voting for the pro-establishment camp. Interestingly, Home-
owner also has a negative and significant impact on voting
for the traditional opposition camp, the pan-democrats,
even though Homeowner is not significantly correlated
with affinity for pan-democrats as shown in Table 2. This re-
sult may be due to the strategic voting that we mentioned.
In particular, some non-homeowners who prefer localists to
the pan-democrats may end up voting for the latter in
hopes of preventing the least preferred—namely, the pro-
establishment camp—from getting elected. The results in
Table 3 support Hypothesis 3.
The coefficient on the variable Income is statistically dif-
ferent from zero in the “Localist” columns. The result is in-
consistent with Hypothesis 5, which predicts a weak
correlation between income and vote choice. Note, how-
ever, that the coefficient is positive, indicating that high-in-
come individuals are actually more likely to vote for
localists than for the pro-establishment camp. The finding
suggests that holding home ownership constant, high-in-
come people are fairly dissatisfied with the status quo. Part
of the reason may be that high-income people have a
higher expectation of their consumption power. When they
find it increasingly difficult to purchase a property, the sta-
tus inconsistency is likely greater than that experienced by
individuals who earn less. Consequently, such income-rich,
asset poor individuals become one of the most dissatisfied
groups. In sum, although the data do not support Hypoth-
esis 5, the positive and significant coefficient on income is
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Table 2 – Correlates of political identification
Homeowner
-0.101
(0.212)
0.457*
(0.251)
-0.681***
(0.233)
-0.092
(0.214)
0.430*
(0.254)
-0.635***
(0.235)   
Income
0.002
(0.063)
-0.029
(0.071)
0.073
(0.068)
0.001
(0.063)
-0.024
(0.071)
0.067   
(0.068)   
Young
-0.092
(0.199)
-0.729***
(0.235)
0.764***
(0.222)
0.014
(0.181)
-0.614***
(0.222)
0.777***
(0.206)   
Female
-0.324
(0.209)
-0.443*
(0.230)
-0.012
(0.227)
-0.325
(0.209)
-0.436*
(0.229)
-0.019   
(0.227)   
Married
-0.531***
(0.203)
1.026***
(0.244)
-0.352
(0.241)
-0.506**
(0.208)
0.984***
(0.252)
-0.266   
(0.246)   
Education
0.017
(0.041)
-0.037
(0.046)
0.054
(0.046)
0.016
(0.042)
-0.032
(0.046)
0.046   
(0.046)   
HKBorn
0.664*
(0.371)
-0.606*
(0.364)
0.010
(0.338)
0.669*
(0.371)
-0.612*
(0.365)
0.020   
(0.340)   
Constant
4.744***
(0.519)
4.466***
(0.528)
3.868***
(0.507)
4.717***
(0.520)
4.483***
(0.530)
3.810***
(0.508)
Number of
observations
1677 1689 1660 1677 1689 1660
R squared 0.02 0.08 0.04 0.02 0.08 0.05
Dependent 
variable
(1)
Favour 
pan-democrat
(2)
Favour 
pro-establishment
(3)
Favour 
localist
(4)
Favour 
pan-democrat
(5)
Favour 
pro-establishment
(6)
Favour 
localist
Notes: Favour pan-democrat, Favour pro-establishment, and Favour localist refer to the variables LikePanDemo, LikeProEst, and LikeLocal, respectively. Estimation strategy is or-
dinary least squares. Standard errors are in parentheses. * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.
Definition of young:
(1)
Young <= 25
(2)
Young <= 30
Table 3 – Correlates of vote choice
Homeowner
-0.710***
(0.261)
-0.555**
(0.246)
-0.612** 
(0.264)   
-0.554** 
(0.249)   
Income
0.146**
(0.067)
0.050
(0.073)
0.139** 
(0.066)   
0.052   
(0.072)   
Young
1.297***
(0.258)
-0.173
(0.287)
1.361***
(0.226)   
-0.056   
(0.254)   
Female
0.450*
(0.246)
0.357
(0.226)
0.442*  
(0.245)   
0.355   
(0.225)   
Married
-0.630***
(0.235)
-0.837***
(0.262)
-0.465*  
(0.237)   
-0.825***
(0.272)   
Education
-0.011
(0.048)
-0.029
(0.045)
-0.036   
(0.048)   
-0.028   
(0.046)   
HKBorn
0.356
(0.401)
0.585
(0.362)
0.371   
(0.398)   
0.586   
(0.362)   
Constant
-1.181**
(0.564)
0.052
(0.531)
-1.256** 
(0.556)  
0.024   
(0.532)  
Number of
observations
1173 1173 1173 1173
Notes: Estimation strategy is multinomial logistic regression. The dependent variable is Vote. 
The baseline comparison group is voting for the pro-establishment camp (Vote = 3). 
Standard errors are in parentheses. * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.
Comparison group: Localist Pan-democratic Localist Pan-democratic
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consistent with our contention that asset ownership forms a salient political
cleavage in Hong Kong. 
The coefficients shown in Table 3 are the relative log odds. It would be
easier to interpret the effects of Homeowner by converting the log odds
into probabilities. Figure 2 displays how Homeowner affects the predicted
probability of voting for different political camps. The two graphs on the
left indicate that the probability that homeowners would vote for the op-
position, regardless of whether localist or not, is generally lower than non-
homeowners. By contrast, the former’s probability of voting for the
pro-establishment camp is markedly higher than the latter. 
As for the other control variables, Young is positive and significantly cor-
related with voting for the localist camp in both Specifications (1) and (2),
suggesting that young people’s probability of voting for the localists is sig-
nificantly higher than the probability of voting for the pro-establishment
camp. Female voters and voters with higher income have a higher proba-
bility of voting for the localist camp, while married respondents are less
likely to vote for the localist camp and the pan-democrats. 
Conclusion
Localist parties are an emerging political force in Hong Kong’s political
landscape. In this article, we present a political economy explanation for
the increasing popularity of localism. Our contention is that global and re-
gional economic factors have dramatically fuelled asset prices in Hong Kong
since the mid-2000s, producing impactful consequences of wealth redistri-
bution. Asset-holders benefit tremendously from this hike in asset prices,
while those who have no assets stand to lose. The former favour the socio-
economic status quo that causes the latter frustration and despair. The di-
vergent economic outcomes translate into political preferences. While
asset-holders favour political parties that preserve the status quo, the non-
asset holders prefer those that attempt to subvert it.
We tested our argument using a post-election public opinion survey. Con-
sistent with our expectations, we find that homeowners dislike localist par-
ties and tend to vote for pro-establishment parties. The results are robust
to the control of, for example, income, education, and different dummy vari-
ables for young voters. 
Piketty (2014) points out that wealth inequality in the twenty-first cen-
tury has mainly been caused by the capital gains, such as housing and the
stock market, rather than by labour income. This effect is more pronounced
in countries with lower tax and less government spending on public goods
and redistribution (Albertus and Menaldo 2016). Hong Kong is a small open
economy with low tax and relatively low welfare redistribution. Not sur-
prisingly, wealth inequality in Hong Kong is one of the highest in the world.
Recent developments in the global economy have aggravated this wealth
inequality further by fuelling the asset prices. 
From this perspective, the rise of localism in Hong Kong is not unique.
Rather, the economic mechanism behind it is broadly comparable with the
rise of right-wing localism in other countries such as the United States with
low tax and low welfare redistribution. The argument we present in this ar-
ticle should complement existing explanations for the rise of localism in
Hong Kong, which focus rather exclusively on factors or experiences that
are peculiar to Hong Kong.
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Figure 2 – Predicted probabilities of vote choice based on home ownership
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Source: Authors’ calculation based on the HKES data.
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Appendix – Classification of political parties/individuals by camp in 2016 Legislative Council election
Political camp Political parties
Pan-democratic Democratic Party
Pan-democratic Civic Party
Pan-democratic Labor Party
Pan-democratic League of Social Democrats (LSD)
Pan-democratic People Power
Pan-democratic Hong Kong Association for Democracy and People's Livelihood (ADPL)
Pan-democratic Neighbourhood and Workers' Service Centre
Pan-democratic Neo Democrats
Pro-establishment Democratic Alliance for the Betterment and Progress of Hong Kong (DAB)
Pro-establishment Hong Kong Federation of Trade Unions (FTU)
Pro-establishment New People's Party
Pro-establishment Liberal Party
Pro-establishment Business and Professionals Alliance for Hong Kong (BPA)
Localist Civic Passion
Localist Proletariat Political Institute
Localist Youngspiration
Localist Demosisto
Localist Local Power
Localist Democracy Groundwork
Localist Pioneer of Victoria Park
Localist Hong Kong Localism Power
Localist Kowloon East Community
Localist Chu Hoi-dick Eddie
Localist Wong Sum-yu
Localist Chui Chi-kin
Notes: The list excludes political parties or individuals disqualified from running for the election.
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